High cell density and close proximity of diverse species of microorganisms are typical of life in natural biofilms. These conditions give ample opportunity for both competitive and cooperative interactions between individuals of the same and different species. Cooperative behaviour benefits the group of neighbouring microbes but comes at a fitness cost for the cooperating individuals. This creates a conflict of interest between the fitness of the individual and the fitness of the group. Individuals that defect from cooperation and therefore do not pay the cost but nevertheless benefit from the cooperative behaviour of others are called cheaters. Cooperative behaviour in the presence of cheaters constitutes altruism towards the cheaters. The aim of this review is two-fold: first, to introduce key concepts from kin selection and group selection theory that allow us to understand how cooperative behaviour can evolve in the face of cheaters; secondly, to draw attention to the conflicts of interest prevalent in biofilms yet largely ignored in the biofilm literature. Examples discussed comprise growth restraint in stationary phase as an instance of the Prisoner's Dilemma, growth restraint to allow channel formation, restraint in resource consumption or economical use of resources as altruistic behaviour, population heterogeneity as insurance against environmental changes, cooperative investment in diffusible exoenzymes, cooperation of pathogens and virulence, diffusion sensing versus quorum sensing and the inflation of signals, antibiotic resistance as collective action, and programmed cell death. 
I NTROD UCTION
The key problem for the evolution of cooperation is the fitness cost for those individuals investing in cooperative behaviour. These individuals produce a "public good" that increases the fitness of the group as a whole. Those members of a group that do not cooperate and hence do not pay the costs but can nevertheless benefit from the public good produced by the cooperative individuals are called cheaters. Such conflicts of interest between individuals and groups or the whole biofilm community abound in biofilms; yet countless biofilm studies interpret life in biofilms as if there were no such conflicts. The tendency to this intuitive but uncritical view is reminiscent of the situation in evolutionary biology before the 1960s that led to the premature dismissal of group selection from evolutionary thought. It is the aim of this review, therefore, to raise the biofilm researchers' awareness of conflicts of interest in biofilms so that invoking group-benefits as an explanation for the evolution of cooperative behaviour is based on careful scrutiny that cannot be discredited again as naïve. Further, the framework of multi-level selection theory as a generic explanation of the evolution of cooperative behaviour despite the fitness costs will be briefly explained and brought to bear on the study of competition and cooperation in biofilms.
I N D IVI D UAL-LEVE L VE R SUS G ROU P-LEVE L S E LECTION
The following very brief review of those parts of evolutionary theory dealing with the origin and maintenance of cooperative behaviour serves merely to provide the background for the discussion of the biofilm-related examples in the remainder of this review. This foray into evolutionary biology is based mainly on the book by Sober & Wilson (1998) . Below, I describe a few complementary rather than conflicting theories to explain the evolution of cooperation despite the challenge due to cheaters.
Kin selection (or inclusive fitness) theory (Hamilton, 1964a,b) explains how selfish genes can lead to cooperative behaviour: since relatives of an individual carry the same genes, with a probability depending on their relatedness r, the inclusive fitness of an individual's genes can increase when the benefit b (weighted by relatedness) of helping a relative is greater than the cost c, rb > c (Hamilton's rule) . In a phrase probably due to J. B. S. Haldane, it makes sense to die "to save two brothers or eight cousins". Kin selection obviously works when you can remember and recognize your kin, but it also works for bacteria if dispersal of individuals is limited so that neighbours are probably also relatives, although increased local competition among neighbours might cancel this effect (Queller, 2004) .
Reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) , the repeated exchange of altruistic acts between two individuals, is another means for the evolution of cooperation, as it is not based on helping relatives but on the principle of "you scratch my back and I scratch yours". Indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) does not require the same individuals ever to meet again; it is based on the principle of "give and you shall be given". "Helping the helpful" works because the altruistic acts increase the reputation, image score, or standing of the altruist. Since this requires some form of image scoring, it is found primarily in higher animals such as primates and cleaner fish (Bshary, 2002) .
Group selection theory (or more generally, multi-level selection theory) assumes that selection takes place not only on the level of the individual but also on lower and higher levels of organization such as genes, groups, or communities. A group may be defined as the set of individuals of a population that interacts and therefore influences each other's fitness, whether they are neighbours or not. The three main ingredients of Darwinian evolutionphenotypic variability, heredity of this variability, and the differential fitness of the various phenotypes -can be found on different levels of organization: genes within a cell's genome, cells within a multicellular organism, individuals within a group, groups within a (meta)population, and populations within a community. Note that multi-level selection theory is particularly suited to explaining social behaviour in biofilms because many cooperative interactions in biofilms are across species. Such interactions cannot be understood within the framework of kin selection theory (inclusive fitness), since the interacting individuals are not related at all in this case. In fact, kin selection theory (Hamilton, 1964a,b) can be seen as a special case of multi-level selection theory because the high relatedness in groups of kin automatically minimizes variation within and maximizes variation between groups, thereby reducing the effectiveness of individual-level selection and enhancing the effectiveness of group-level selection (Sober & Wilson, 1998) .
S I M PSON'S PARADOX
How fitness advantages on the group level can lead to the success of group-beneficial traits despite the fitness costs of the investment in cooperation is an example of a counterintuitive statistical result known as Simpson's paradox (Sober, 1993) . This is best explained by way of an example.
Consider a group consisting of A altruists and S selfish individuals, then the total number of individuals is N = A + S, the frequency of altruists is p = A/N and the frequency of S is (1 − p). Assume that the benefit b derived from the behaviour of an altruistic individual is shared equally among all members of the group rather than directed towards a particular individual. This simplifies analysis without affecting the qualitative outcome, and seems appropriate for microorganisms, which cannot usually distinguish between individuals or their kind (with the exception of "greenbeard" alleles in Dictyostelium discoideum; see Queller et al., 2003) . Investments into a public good such as exoenzymes for the degradation of particulate organic matter would be such a case of undirected benefits because the exoenzymes and their breakdown products diffuse around. Within such a group, the fitness of the selfish subgroup F S is the sum of a basal fitness F 0 (the fitness in the absence of altruistic behaviour) and the benefit b from the behaviour of the altruistic group members with frequency p: F S = F 0 + pb. The fitness of the altruistic subgroup F A is reduced by the cost of altruistic behaviour c and hence is always lower than F S :
The benefit is assumed to be larger than this cost, otherwise the altruistic strategy would not be viable. The fitness of the group as a whole F G , is the weighted sum of the fitnesses of the subgroups:
these fitnesses, the number of individuals, N, in the next generation, t + 1, can be found: N t +1 = N t F G and
Now consider a second group with a different frequency of altruists p, and therefore different fitnesses of altruists and non-altruists as well as the group, since all these fitnesses are frequency dependent. While the relative fitness of the altruists is lower than the fitness of the nonaltruists within each group, the overall number of altruists may nevertheless increase, because the predominantly altruistic group has far more offspring, offsetting the reduction in the altruists' frequency. Using parameter values of F 0 = 10, c = 1, and b = 5, Table 1 summarizes this example of Simpson's paradox. Note that summing over all groups, as is done in Table 1 , is only meaningful when groups compete. If groups were isolated from each other, the frequency of altruists would continuously decline. What altruists need in order to survive is a refounding or reassortment of groups from the individuals of more than one group, in other words, a purification step.
H I STORY OF G ROU P-S E LECTION TH EORY
Darwin never discussed the importance of group selection explicitly, but he only rarely invoked group selection to explain the evolution of behavioural traits as, for example, the evolution of morality in human tribes (Darwin, 1871) . His successors, however, often invoked group selection uncritically whenever it came in handy or seemed intuitively correct. According to Dobzhansky (1937) , whole species maintain genetic diversity to cope with environmental changes. According to Allee (1951) , dominance hierarchies exist because they minimize within-group conflict, allowing the group as a whole to be more productive. According to Wynne-Edwards (1962) , individuals restrain themselves from eating and breeding in order to avoid the population crashing to extinction.
This intuitive appeal to group selection was criticized by a number of biologists in the 1960s, most influentially by G. C. Williams's 1966 book Adaptation and Natural Selection, where, for example, he argued that a fleet herd of deer is just a herd of fleet deer: the group runs fast not because this benefits the group but because it benefits each individual. Applying Ockham's razor, we also should appeal to group-level benefits as the explanation of a certain behaviour only if there are no benefits of this behaviour for the individuals. In other words, only if there is a conflict of interest between individual and group level should we invoke group-level selection as an explanation.
The development in the 1970s of a new theory of group selection that could withstand these criticisms was championed by Wilson (1975) and supported by laboratory experiments with flour beetles by Wade (1976) , but the critique of the naïve appeal to group-level selection was so devastating that evolutionary biologists largely ignored or opposed these developments. Multilevel selection theory became accepted only recently, at the end of the 1990s, long after experimental tests in agreement with the predictions of this theory were made.
If the, often uncritical, invocation of group-level benefits as the obvious explanation for biofilm characteristics is replaced by a detailed analysis of evolutionary processes on multiple levels of selection according to the criteria outlined below, a similar fate of outlawed grouplevel thinking may be avoided.
HOW TO D E MON STRATE G ROU P-LEVE L S E LECTION
As an exercise in differentiating between individual and group level of selection, determine which survival strategies would evolve, assuming that (a) only individuallevel selection is at work, maximizing the fitness of the individual, and (b) only group-level selection is at work, maximizing the fitnesses of the group. This forces one to think separately about the relative fitness of individuals within groups and the relative fitnesses of groups in the "global" population, and sets the extremes of what one might find out there. Now examine the three essential ingredients of natural selection at each level. The ingredients are: (a) phenotypic variation among units, (b) heritability of these phenotypes, and (c) differences in survival and reproduction between the various phenotypes. Looking at phenotypic variation first, it is clear that when all the members of each group are identical and only groups differ from each other, group-level selection is the only option. By the same token, if members of a group differ from each other but each group has the same composition, only individual-level selection is possible. Again, this sets the extremes. The amount of variation among groups may depend on the size of the group, the degree of clonality, and the degree of dispersal between groups. Now looking at inheritance of the phenotype, this is easier to study on the individual level, at least for asexual organisms, but even here the relationship between phenotype and genotype can be a complex non-linear mapping. Further, with phase variation, it is not the current phenotype that is inherited but the set of potential phenotypes together with the probabilities and triggers of switching. At the group level, inheritance is based on formation and dispersal of groups rather than on birth and death as for individuals, and may be more difficult to track. Fortunately, response to selection is proof of heritability, irrespective of the level. Finally, looking at fitness consequences of heritable variation, the intensity of natural selection at each level needs to be considered.
Experimental studies have shown how easily cooperation in groups of bacteria evolves, supporting the view that group-level selection may well dominate individuallevel selection in biofilms or related spatially structured systems (Rainey & Rainey, 2003; Velicer & Yu, 2003) .
COOPE RATION AN D CON FLICTS OF I NTE R E ST I N B IOFI LM S
Microorganisms growing in biofilms have many neighbours close by. Further, in between abrupt changes, an organism will have more or less the same neighbours on the timescale of growth and selection (generations). This gives ample opportunities for cooperation, division of labour and conflicts, whether between individuals of the same species or those of different species. The comparison with life in a city seems most appropriate (Watnick & Kolter, 2000) .
Cooperation among bacteria is now widely recognized (Crespi, 2001 ), but the fact that cooperation is under constant threat from selfish individuals that benefit from collectively produced public goods while contributing less (cheaters) is often neglected in the biofilm field, presumably since most researchers' background is in microbiology rather than evolution. The aim of this review is thus to draw these conflicts of interest to the attention of biofilm researchers and re-interpret familiar observations from the perspective of multi-level selection theory. (For a recent review of social behaviour and resulting conflicts, see Velicer, 2003 ; for strategies to control cheating, see Travisano & Velicer, 2004.) The following sections present a subjective choice of examples, in favour of examples where conflicts have either been studied in some depth or where conflicts have been largely ignored.
G ROWTH R E STRAI NT I N STATIONARY PHAS E
Populations of wild-type Escherichia coli K12 arrest growth before the substrate has been completely exhausted in response to several extracellular and intracellular signals. This programmed transition to a non-dividing state of reduced metabolic activity allows prolonged survival, since it can be sustained on the left-over resources for a long time. GASP (growth advantage in stationary phase) mutants fail to respond to the signals and therefore continue to grow at the expense of the scarce resources still available, leading to an increase in the frequency of the GASP mutants during stationary phase in mixed cultures. Pure cultures of GASP mutants have higher death rates in stationary phase. GASP mutants have a higher relative fitness than the cooperating wild type at all relative frequencies in mixed cultures, but the magnitude of this advantage decreases with increasing frequency of GASP (Vulic & Kolter, 2001 ). In the framework of multi-level selection theory, these results can be easily understood: growth arrest is beneficial for the long-term survival of the population, but the rise of the GASP mutants with their higher individual fitness at all relative frequencies can only be selected against on the group level, which requires that (a) groups with a lower frequency of cheaters have a higher fitness and (b) groups are refounded from single cells (cf. the example for Simpson's paradox in Table 1 ). Both requirements can be easily met experimentally by allowing growth to proceed through a sufficiently long stationary phase and by starting new cultures from single cells.
This conflict of interest can be easily understood also in terms of game theory as an example of the Prisoner's Dilemma (Brembs, 1996) . The characteristic of the Prisoner's Dilemma is that defection is the unbeatable strategy if the game is only played once. If players cooperate, their payoff R (reward for mutual cooperation) is higher than their payoff P (punishment for mutual defection) when both defect. A player defecting from a cooperator receives payoff T (temptation to defect), which is higher than R, while a player cooperating with a defector receives payoff S (sucker's payoff), which is lower than P. The rank order of payoffs thus is T > R > P > S. As a consequence, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, the fitness of defectors decreases with increasing frequency of defectors but is nevertheless always higher than the fitness of cooperators. Conversely, in the game of Chickens, the payoff P for mutual defection is lower than S for cooperating with a defector, so that, at a high enough frequency of defectors, the fitness of defectors is lower than the fitness of cooperators. Apart from the above GASP mutants versus wild type, the Prisoner's Dilemma game is also played by selfish RNA phage φ6 mutants sequestering a larger share of intracellular products than the wild type does (Turner & Chao, 1999) . The Chicken game is played by Myxococcus xanthus (Velicer et al., 2000; Velicer, 2003) and the above RNA phage φ6 mutant when playing against a variant evolved under low multiplicity of infection in order to be more cooperative than the wild type (Turner & Chao, 2003) . Whether yeast cheater mutants that do not produce the exoenzyme invertase play the Prisoner's Dilemma or Chicken game is not clear from the data published so far (Greig & Travisano, 2004) .
Since only the upper layer or the fingertips of biofilms receive considerable amounts of substrate, substrate levels in most parts of a biofilm resemble liquid cultures in stationary phase; hence the rise of GASP-type cheating mutants can be expected to occur in biofilms.
G ROWTH R E STRAI NT TO ALLOW CHAN N E L FOR MATION
Channels or valleys in biofilms can be observed in many cases, and liquid flow through these channels has been demonstrated (Stoodley et al., 1994) . The common view of such channels is that the biofilm community as a whole benefits from their presence because they enlarge surface area and therefore enhance substrate flux to the biofilm. There are two problems with this view.
One problem is that demonstrating locally enhanced mass transfer due to channels may not be the whole story, since enhanced substrate conversion in an upstream location of a channel may be set off by reduced conversion downstream due to the enhanced substrate depletion upstream. In fact, overall mass transfer of substrate to the biofilm has been predicted to decrease with increasing roughness in a modelling study of mass transfer by diffusion and convection for biofilm structures with various surface area enlargements and roughnesses (Picioreanu et al., 2000) . Despite the increase of real biofilm surface area with increasing roughness, the effective mass transfer area actually decreases because only biofilm peaks receive substrate, unless convection in the valleys dominates at very high bulk liquid flow rates (>0.2 m/s). A recent independent modelling study confirms these results (Klapper, 2004) .
The other problem is a conflict of interest. If channels do increase substrate flux to the biofilm surface, if not globally then at least locally, why do those bacteria lining the channel walls in areas of increased substrate flux not take advantage of the increased flux and grow, thereby clogging the channels? What restrains them from growing? Just recently, a mechanism for this growth restraint appears to have been found at least for Pseudomonas aeruginosa: rhamnolipid surfactants, which are produced at high cell densities, keep the channels open and impede attachment (Davey et al., 2003) . The beauty of this solution is that cheating appears to be impossible because the mechanism of rhamnolipid action is physical rather than biological. (While cheating in growth restraint does not seem possible, cheating in rhamnolipid production is possible, since this is a costly investment into a public good.)
However, if channel formation is actually reducing the overall substrate conversion rate of the biofilm as the above-mentioned models suggest, the interpretation of the results of Davey et al. (2003) has to be changed: the maintenance of channels may be an undesired byproduct of the action of rhamnolipids, whose production has actually evolved in order to prevent the attachment of immigrants.
R E STRAI NT I N R E SOU RCE CON SU M PTION
Due to a trade-off between specific growth rate and growth yield, bacteria face an evolutionary choice between alternative strategies of resource use: a high growth rate at the cost of a low yield strategy versus a high growth yield at the cost of slow growth strategy. The trade-off is based on irreversible thermodynamics, which postulates that (metabolic) flux (proportional to growth rate) is proportional to the thermodynamic driving force, which is proportional to Gibbs free energy dissipation (Westerhoff & van Dam, 1987) .
A high growth yield is equivalent to an economical use of resources, as fewer resources are consumed per unit biomass formed. A high yield therefore benefits all those sharing the resource (unless the resource is unlimited), while a high growth rate benefits the individual. This conflict of interest is known as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . Further, the high-yield strategy is an example of altruism because a bacterium with high yield benefits all members of the group, including cheaters (increasing the fitness of the group relative to groups of non-altruists), while suffering a reduced growth rate (decreasing the fitness of the individual relative to other non-altruistic individuals within the group) (Kreft, 2004) .
Since the strategies involved are extremely simple, as they do not require any direct interaction between cells, let alone recognition of individuals or memory of past interactions, and the trade-off results from an unavoidable thermodynamic constraint, it is arguably the oldest form of altruism (Kreft, 2004) .
The competition of strategies based on this trade-off was first investigated by Bonhoeffer and co-workers (Pfeiffer et al., 2001; Pfeiffer & Bonhoeffer, 2003) . They pointed out that respiration, in contrast to fermentation, is such a high-yield strategy that provides a strong fitness advantage to a cluster of respiring organisms. This group fitness advantage would have been immediately available during the evolutionary origin of a multicellular organism from high-yield strategists, whereas the typical advantages of multicellularity such as division of labour among differentiated cells could have become available only later. Kreft (2004) has examined the competition of high-rate versus high-yield strategies in a model of biofilms that considers the biomass spreading and substrate diffusion typical of biofilms. The high-rate strategy was assumed to have a doubled maximum specific growth rate and a halved yield relative to the high-yield strategy. As a consequence, the high-rate strategy's maximum substrate consumption rate is four times higher. These growth characteristics were simplified from data given by Kappler et al. (1997) . The dependence of growth rate on substrate concentration was assumed to follow Monod kinetics (a proportional increase in growth rate with substrate concentration until growth rate starts to saturate at higher substrate concentrations, asymptotically approaching the maximal growth rate). Further, the substrate affinity in the sense of Button (1991) was assumed to be the same for both strategies (substrate affinity is defined as the initial slope of the Monod curve, i.e. the ratio of maximum specific growth rate to half-saturation constant). Given these growth parameters, the growth rate of the high-rate strategy is higher at all positive substrate concentrations. Therefore, in a continuous, well-mixed system (chemostat), the high-rate strategy will be unbeatable.
In a biofilm, results differ. An individual-based model of bacterial growth and substrate consumption was employed to let the two strategies compete in a biofilm setting. During the initial phase of growth, when only a few cells are attached to the substratum, the highrate strategy has the advantage; but it is a short-term advantage, since the increasing biomass, and hence substrate consumption rate, leads to increasingly severe substrate limitation, where the high-yield strategy has the advantage of economical resource use, which benefits all neighbours that share the resource. Clearly, high-rate strategists may also benefit from this economy, but the microcolony structure of biofilms with predominantly clonal cell clusters, formed by the offspring of immotile and attached cells, results in most neighbours being followers of the same strategy. Therefore a large enough cluster of economic resource users is unbeatable and it produces more offspring per substrate consumed. This higher relative fitness on the group level, combined with lower fitness on the individual level, may lead to an increase of altruists globally (given that groups of mainly selfish strategists compete with groups of mainly altruistic strategists), while the proportion of altruists declines within each cluster, in other words an example of Simpson's paradox. As noted above, the summing over all groups is only meaningful if there is an exchange between groups or reformation of groups. Were the groups isolated, nothing would offset the decline in the frequency of altruists in each group. In the case of bacteria, the easiest and most robust way of group reformation is a "purification step": the reformation of groups from single cells, as used in the isolation of pure strains of bacteria. From shedding single cells to total disintegration of patches of biofilms, anything that leads to purification of clusters would work, as would selective coaggregation of altruists, as observed with the "greenbeard" allele csA in Dictyostelium discoideum (Queller et al., 2003) .
Spatial structure of the population, the more or less clonal clusters of cells, and the self-generated substrate gradients are typical of biofilms, and essential for the evolution of this primitive altruistic strategy. Predictions from models assuming that spatial structure can be neglected would clearly be grossly misleading in this case, suggesting that results of models without explicit spatial structure should be interpreted with caution.
Further, the study by Kreft (2004) shows that, for the rate versus yield trade-off, there is a considerable range of conditions under which group-level selection is stronger than individual-level selection in biofilms, allowing the origin and maintenance of the altruistic strategy of restraint from wasting resources.
Let us now look at the ingredients of Darwinian selection one by one in order to apply the criteria for demonstrating group selection introduced above to this example of altruism.
Phenotypic variation: Phenotypic variation of indi-
viduals was assumed to be in fundamental growth parameters: maximal specific growth rate and growth yield. Phenotypic variation between the groups is due to the clonal growth of a progenitor into a cluster of cells with the phenotype of the progenitor. 2. Heritability of phenotypes: Heritability of the phenotype of the individual was again assumed. Heritability of the phenotype of the group is guaranteed because the group's phenotype is a composite of the phenotypes of the members, and new groups formed by dispersal of an existing group will initially have the same phenotype on average. 3. Fitness differences between phenotypes: Assuming only individual-level selection, the fitness of individuals would be highest when they have the highest growth rate under given conditions such as substrate concentration. This can be seen easily in chemostat competition where, due to mixing, all bacteria compete globally for the same resource. Assuming only group-level selection, the fitness of the group would be highest when the total number of offspring of the group is highest per volume cleared of (limiting) resources; in other words, group fitness is highest when yield is maximal. This can be seen easily by comparing growth rates of whole biofilms, i.e. in the absence of competition, the ratio of biomasses of the high-yield strategy biofilm to the high-rate strategy biofilm is close to the ratio of the respective yields (Kreft, 2004 ).
G ROU P B E N E FITS OF POPU LATION H ETE ROG E N E ITY: TH E I N SU RANCE HYPOTH E S I S
The idea of the insurance hypothesis is that increasing biodiversity insures ecosystems against declines in their functioning caused by environmental fluctuations. Insurance effects may be defined as any long-term effects of biodiversity that contribute to maintain or enhance ecosystem functioning in the face of environmental fluctuations (Yachi & Loreau, 1999) . That idea can be taken from this community level and applied to the level of populations, where diversification of the population into an ensemble of various subpopulations can be viewed as a functional population level adaptation because the population benefits if a small subpopulation exists that is sufficiently better adapted to face sufficiently likely future events or environmental conditions, such as the sudden discharge of intestinal populations of warmblooded animals into cold fresh water. Obviously, this population-level benefit implies that the subpopulation is ill adapted to the current conditions and therefore suffers a disadvantage in individual-level selection. Three kinds of solution for the problem of insurance, two specific and one general, can be conceived. These are discussed below on the basis of a simple conceptual model of two different subpopulations, one better adapted to the current environment, and one better adapted to other environmental conditions that may be found in another location in time and space. Obviously, the implicit assumption is that you cannot have both, a population that is better adapted to both conditions, but such a trade-off is presumably the rule rather than the exception.
One specific solution would consist in rapid interconversion of the two subpopulations, sufficiently fast on the timescale of selection (generations). Selection would still favour individuals of one subpopulation, but each individual would be favoured only intermittently for a short while and, on average, for only a part of the time (depending on the two rates of conversion). I am not aware of an example for this solution, so it may not be any good, although it would have some merits for environments that are constant for prolonged periods of time, and the ill-adapted subpopulation would be the insurance for rare events that would be fatal for the well-adapted subpopulation.
A related specific solution would also consist in interconversion of the two subpopulations, but not so fast that selection would overlook the fitness differences between the subpopulations. Rather, this solution relies on cycling between two environments repeatedly, such as from the gut of a warm-blooded animal to cold fresh water and back again. Selection would tend to drive one subpopulation to extinction as the interconversion between the subpopulations is slow and, when the environment indeed does not change, the ill-adapted subpopulation would be maintained at a low but positive level owing to only the infrequent conversions. In fact, a mutant that does not give rise to a low level of ill-adapted individuals in its offspring would have a higher fitness and eventually outcompete the insured wild type when the environment does not change. Paying for insurance does not make sense if there are no risks. Here, cyclic change keeps in check the cheater that does not produce ill-adapted offspring and therefore has a higher individuallevel fitness.
Phase variation is a widespread and well-studied example of this type of insurance. Cyclic changes of environmental conditions could consist of shifts from inside to outside a host or from biofilm to planktonic phase. Surface structures such as fimbriae are often subject to phase variation because they play a key role in adhesion to surfaces and as targets of the immune system. In P. aeruginosa, antibiotic-resistant small-colony variants have been isolated many times from the sputum of cystic fibrosis patients (Drenkard & Ausubel, 2002) . (For a more thorough discussion of phase variation examples in biofilms, see the review by Hansen & Molin, 2004.) The generic mechanism of insurance does not rely on regular, cyclic changes between environments as above, therefore it relies entirely on the group benefit of diversification and the fitness benefit for the group must be strong enough to counteract the fitness disadvantage of insurers within each group. The formation of resting stages such as persisters (Lewis, 2000; Gilbert et al., 2002; Sufya et al., 2003) , dormant cells or the more differentiated spores (Kaprelyants et al., 1993) as a subpopulation offers the most general protection against all possible events, while the fitness disadvantage of a non-growing dormant cell (while the conditions are favourable for growth) is maximal. If the rate of formation of resting stages were too high, the individual-level fitness of insurer strategists that spin off persisters or other resting stages would decrease more than could be compensated for by the increased group-level fitness.
Conflicts of interest in populations of sporulating Bacillus subtilis have been demonstrated between sporulating cells that try to delay sporulation, in order to continue growing, by inhibiting sporulation and inducing lysis in siblings (Gonzalez-Pastor et al., 2003) .
An alternative to insurance consists in rapid adaptation in times of change (Hansen & Molin, 2004) ; rather than paying for insurance by preparing for changes ahead of time, the population may have evolved to have an increased mutation rate, thus allowing faster adaptation (but note that mutation rates are not limiting the speed of evolution in very large populations; Wick et al., 2002) . Such potential for rapid change of the uninsured population can be due to mutator mutations, i.e. mutations that decrease the fidelity of DNA repair or replication. Most mutator mutations are in the methyldirected mismatch repair system (Giraud et al., 2001) . However, the benefits of the mutator state are only short-term as it leads to an accumulation of detrimental mutations (Giraud et al., 2001) . These detrimental mutations, like the mutator state itself, may "hitchhike" with the (probably single) advantageous mutation generated during the mutator state because the inheritance of these mutations is coupled when they are on the same chromosome. The occurrence of small fractions of mutators in natural populations of Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica is widespread (LeClerc et al., 1996; Matic et al., 1997) . The presence of a subpopulation of mutator genotypes in itself could be seen as a form of insurance.
The stress-induced, transient increase of mutation rates (Bjedov et al., 2003) may be the better alternative, since mutation rates are increased only when a stress response has been triggered, although some changes of the environment that could lead to adaptation may not trigger any stress response.
MYXOBACTE R IAL WOLF-PACK FE E D I NG OR I NVE STM E NT I NTO D I FFUS I B LE EXOE N ZYM E S
Bacteria cannot eat; that is, they cannot ingest particulate food items for their own exclusive use. Instead, they have to excrete enzymes into the medium in order to break down polymeric matter outside the cell, and then take up the soluble oligomers and monomers diffusing towards them but also towards others. Enzyme synthesis is costly, and producing large quantities of a set of enzymes with complementary specificities for the breakdown of complex organic matter is a substantial investment into a public good, if these enzymes can be lost by diffusion and convection because they are not surface bound.
Striking examples are the Myxobacteria, which maintain contact or close proximity throughout their complex life cycle: from social feeding and social motility to social fruiting-body formation. Dispersal via fruiting bodies ensures a high cell density upon germination, which is required for efficient utilization of prey bacteria by excretion of batteries of bacteriolytic and proteolytic enzymes, since both the enzymes and the soluble products of their action tend to be lost through diffusion and convection. At higher cell densities, higher levels of exoenzymes can be attained at the same cost for the individual, and the products of degradation are more likely to be taken up by a group of cells as compared with a single cell (Rosenberg et al., 1977) . This cooperative feeding has been compared to pack hunting in wolves and lions and dubbed wolf-pack feeding (Dworkin, 1972) .
Clearly, cheating is possible here because the benefits from a collectively produced public good such as exoenzymes are shared among all group members, whether or not the member pays the cost of contributing. Another example of such cheating has been found in yeast regarding the production of extracellular invertase (Greig & Travisano, 2004) .
Cheating in all of the major social behaviours rapidly evolves in Myxococcus xanthus populations in well-mixed liquid cultures where social behaviour has no selective advantage (Velicer et al., 1998 (Velicer et al., , 2000 (Velicer et al., , 2002 . Short-term fates of mixed cheater and wild-type strains range from cheater persistence, over self-extinction of cheaters, to total population extinction (Fiegna & Velicer, 2003) . Novel cooperative behaviour also evolves with ease, given the right regime for selection (Velicer & Yu, 2003) .
Although Myxobacteria may not fall strictly into the category of biofilms, they were chosen to explain the general phenomenon of investment into diffusible extracellular compounds. This is clearly highly relevant for biofilms, because cheating and the maintenance of cooperative behaviour against the cheating load are understood so well for this most social group of bacteria.
D I FFUS I B LE EXOE N ZYM E S I N D E NTAL PLAQU E
When several species contribute exoenzymes with differential specificities into the extracellular pool, allowing a more complete breakdown of their shared substrates, synergistic growth occurs. Such mutualistic partnerships have been demonstrated in dental plaque communities (Bradshaw et al., 1994) . The metabolic partnership may be coupled with preferential coadherence, as in Streptococcus oralis 34 and Actinomyces naeslundii T14V, which are both unable to grow on their own on saliva as sole nutrient source, but grow luxuriantly when allowed to coaggregate, even better than Streptococcus gordonii DL1, which can grow independently (Kolenbrander et al., 2002) .
Cheating in exoenzyme production has not been investigated in these multi-species associations, but one might speculate that the division of labour has evolved as a strategy to avoid conflicts of interest, because this would couple the interests of species so that defecting species could not derive a benefit from defection.
D ECR EAS E D AN D I NCR EAS E D VI R U LE NCE AS G ROU P-B E N E FICIAL TRAITS
It is well understood how higher relatedness increases the level of cooperation, both in terms of kinship theory (Hamilton's rule; Hamilton, 1964a,b) and multi-level selection theory (groups of kin have lower variation of fitness within groups and higher variation of fitness between groups; Sober & Wilson, 1998) . But does increased cooperation increase or decrease virulence? The usual argument is that cooperation consists in a reduction of virulence; in other words, avirulence is a cooperative restraint in host exploitation. A mutant with a higher virulence, i.e. higher growth rate in the host, will reach a higher relative frequency in the host (individual-level or short-term advantage), but the host will die sooner and the offspring produced per host will be reduced. A mutant with a reduced virulence will decrease in proportion within the host, but the host will live longer, and more offspring can be produced over the lifetime of the host (group-level or long-term advantage).
However, the higher level of cooperation among relatives can also favour cooperative exploitation of the host, for example cooperative production of siderophores results in higher growth rates and therefore virulence (West & Buckling, 2003) . More generally, higher virulence (due to higher relatedness) is predicted in any case where parasites can cooperate to increase their growth rate, such as immune suppression (West & Buckling, 2003) . However, the mathematical model by West & Buckling (2003) does not consider spatial population structure within a host; hence all bacteria in the host share the siderophores produced. In an experimental test of Hamilton's kin selection theory, extended by Frank (1998) to include the spatial scale of competition (global versus local), Griffin et al. (2004) have shown that increased virulence due to siderophore production evolves when relatedness is high and competition global. In an accompanying comment article, Queller (2004) has pointed out that these results can also be understood in terms of multi-level selection theory: the global versus local competition of Griffin et al. (2004) corresponds to between-group versus withingroup competition of multi-level selection theory. The latter theory would also be suited for understanding the interactions between unrelated species of a polymicrobial infection producing and/or taking up various siderophores.
QUOR U M S E N S I NG: CH EATI NG AN D TH E I N FLATION OF S IG NALS
The quorum signalling system of bacteria is a fascinating new area of research that receives much attention (for recent reviews, see Fuqua et al., 2001; Miller & Bassler, 2001; Swift et al., 2001) . Less attention is given to the conflicts of interest and the actual meaning of the signal. The mainstream interpretation of quorum sensing, and hence the name, is that it allows bacteria to switch to cooperative behaviour once a certain density threshold (quorum) has been reached, avoiding costly expression of cooperative functions when the cell density is too low for these functions to be effective.
Quorum sensing itself is cooperative, as the production of the signal as a public good is shared, and it is used to switch on second-order cooperative behaviour such as production of exoenzymes or virulence factors. Owing to this hierarchical structure of quorum-sensing-based cooperation, not only the "usual" cheats, who benefit from the investments into signal production of their neighbours but do not contribute, but also mutants that manipulate the receivers of the signal could evolve. Common to all signalling systems, conflicts of interest between signallers and receivers can potentially favour "dishonest" and manipulative mutants that elicit responses beneficial to themselves and detrimental to the others (Brown & Johnstone, 2001) . Mutants producing higher quantities of signal may benefit from eliciting increasing cooperative efforts from others. This can lead to a devaluation of the signal. Reliable ("honest") signalling may be an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) only if signalling is costly enough to render dishonesty unprofitable (Brown & Johnstone, 2001) . Using a two-trait model of signal strength and extent of cooperation as a function of relatedness and group size, Brown & Johnstone (2001) show that there is a groupsize threshold for cooperation and that the information on group size must be acquired at some cost. However, their model does not consider spatial population structure, which has repeatedly been shown to either facilitate or permit the evolution of cooperative behaviour (Nowak et al., 1994; Sigmund, 1994; Tilman & Kareiva, 1997 ; see also Kreft, 2004 , and the section on "Restraint in resource consumption", above). Attached bacteria in biofilms grow in clonal clusters, provided that they are immotile or glued together by the biofilm matrix. Such clustering of offspring from a single cell would increase the likelihood that a cell interacts with highly related neighbours. Cluster formation would also limit cross-talk due to common signal molecules between species, which raises issues of confusion, interference, and eavesdropping. Redfield (2002) has expressed an alternative view of autoinducer production: since the signals are diffusible, a high concentration of these signals can result from either high cell density, i.e. many bacteria producing signals in close proximity, or slow diffusive and convective transport away from the producing cell. Imagine a single cell in a little water-filled pocket of a soil crumb producing signal molecules: it will experience high levels of signal because the signal cannot diffuse away. The problem with signalling by production of diffusible autoinducers is that the cell will never know whether the high level is due to slow mass transfer or to high density of neighbouring producers. The advantage of using this type of signalling for diffusion sensing would be for individual cells, while the advantage of using it for quorum sensing would be for the group. As Redfield (2002) correctly pointed out, the group benefit has been uncritically assumed rather than demonstrated. Redfield (2002) further argued that maintaining cooperative strategies is difficult because individual-level selection is more effective than grouplevel selection in genetically mixed populations. However, many biofilms consist of microcolonies, which are in fact clonal rather than mixed. But, even for mixed populations, it cannot be taken for granted that individual-level selection is more effective than group-level selection, even though this may be the common belief among evolutionary biologists. What are required for effective grouplevel selection are pronounced fitness differences between cooperating and non-cooperating groups and sufficiently frequent reassembly of individuals into cooperative and non-cooperative groups to counter the increase of cheaters in predominantly cooperative groups. For interspecies cooperation, the latter may be problematic, as a single cell can obviously not found a mixed-species group. However, coaggregation of preferably only one cell per species would make the formation of cheater-less mixed-species groups fairly likely.
On the basis of the known biochemistry of regulation of the signal synthesis of P. aeruginosa, Dockery & Keener (2001) constructed a mathematical model of quorum sensing. Analysis of the model shows that the kinetics of regulation are such that a biochemical switch exists between two stable steady-state solutions, one with low levels of autoinducer and one with high levels. Switching on occurs at a higher level of autoinducer than switching off (hysteresis). The prediction of hysteresis has to my knowledge not been tested experimentally, but I would like to argue that finding such a hysteretic response would support the view that bacteria use this system to measure cell density (see below).
Since diffusion sensing is not a cooperative trait, it does not lead to conflicts of interest. Demonstrating conflicts of interest would therefore support the view that autoinducers function in quorum sensing. For example, can manipulative mutants producing high quantities of signal be isolated and shown to benefit, at least at low frequency, from coaxing extra cooperation from their neighbours? Brown & Johnstone (2001) have argued that, with increasing conflict, signalling intensity would increase, driven by a competitive devaluation of signal strength. I would argue that the postulated hysteresis in quorum sensing (while cell density increases during growth, cells are up-regulated at a higher cell density threshold than cells are down-regulated upon decreasing cell density; see above) should be seen as an adaptation to increase the cost of signalling, in order to reduce the fitness of manipulative mutants. The existence of hysteresis would support the notion that conflicts of interest are commonplace in autoinducer production. Further evidence for conflicts of interest in autoinducer production comes from the observation that two separate signalling pathways are frequently present in one and the same bacterium, and that the two systems might function as "coincidence detectors" (Mok et al., 2003) . As a mutant is very unlikely to feature enhanced production of both of the signals of two independent signalling pathways, integration of two signals would make the system more robust against manipulative mutants. Also, it is difficult to picture the switching on of bioluminescence in free-living Vibrio species clusters as a sensible response to a diffusion-sensing signal.
Signalling by direct contact interactions, however, would appear to be a better method of quorum sensing than the production of diffusible signals that always provide ambiguous information. Myxobacteria, in contrast to slime moulds, have developed such direct contact signals that do not diffuse away. The C-signal is transmitted directly by end-to-end contact between pairs of cells, leading to an increase of C-signal (positive feedback), and during the initial phase of development (rippling phase), when the C-signal concentration is below a certain threshold, to reversal of gliding direction. Later, during fruiting body formation, when the concentration of C-signal has risen above the threshold, the cells respond by a decrease of reversal frequency and an increase in speed (Igoshin et al., 2004) . The extracellular appendages of Myxococcus xanthus, called fibrils, have been speculated to act as tactile antennae because they bear an ADPribosylating activity that may be activated upon contact with a receptor on an adjacent cell (Dworkin, 1999) .
Quorum-sensing bacteria face yet another problem: interference by others. Compounds that are structural analogues can block the quorum-sensing system (Givskov et al., 1996; Hentzer et al., 2003) . Further, competitors or hosts of pathogens can produce enzymes that degrade the signal. Numerous bacteria have been shown to produce hydrolytic enzymes degrading acyl-homoserine lactones (Dong et al., 2000 (Dong et al., , 2001 (Dong et al., , 2002 (Dong et al., , 2004 Lin et al., 2003) . Human airway epithelia degrade the primary of the two signals of P. aeruginosa (Chun et al., 2004) .
ANTI B IOTIC R E S I STANCE AS COLLECTIVE ACTION
Resistance of biofilms against antibiotics is a major concern in chronic infections and has been conceptualized as a multicellular characteristic (Stewart & Costerton, 2001) . However, concerted action of all bacteria in a biofilm, while obviously advantageous for the biofilm community as a whole, is prone to exploitation by cheaters, and this has been largely ignored, apart from the study by Dugatkin et al. (2003) . They modelled the frequency dependence of the fitness of two genotypes, producers and non-producers. Producers create, at a certain cost, some "substance" (e.g. an enzyme degrading an antibiotic) that always provides their creators with a benefit and potentially provides some benefits to other group members as well. Non-producers do not produce the substance and pay no cost. This is a remarkable case of frequency-dependent selection because it allows the evolution of group-beneficial behaviour without the usual need for group-level selection (Dugatkin et al., 2003) . However, the critical assumption for this finding is that each producer accrues at least a basal protection against antibiotic action by producing a "substance". Consequently, at low producer frequencies, the producers have a higher fitness than the non-producing defectors (cheaters are defectors that gain an advantage from defection). This is in contrast to the GASP strategy, which is always fitter than the cooperating strategy.
PROG RAM M E D CE LL D EATH
Recent observations of programmed cell death (a genetically programmed process of cellular suicide triggered by some signal) in biofilm populations of P. aeruginosa (Webb et al., 2003b) and Pseudoalteromonas tunicata (Mai-Prochnow et al., 2004) are intriguing as they resemble cell death during fruiting body formation in Myxobacteria and sporulation in bacilli (Webb et al., 2003a) . The dispersal of surviving cells from the interior of biofilm microcolonies appears to be facilitated by this programmed cell death of the majority of the interior population. It is unclear whether the surviving subpopulation of cells induces the lysis of their siblings, similar to the case of cannibalism found in Bacillus subtilis (Gonzalez-Pastor et al., 2003) , or whether they are cheaters not undergoing autolysis, similar to the Myxococcus xanthus mutants with a reduced probability of autolysis during fruiting body development (Velicer et al., 2000) .
